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THE VOID LEFT IN ILLINOIS HOMICIDE LAW AFTER
PEOPLE V. LOPEZ': THE ELIMINATION OF
ATTEMPTED SECOND DEGREE MURDER
INTRODUcTION
Illinois courts have long grappled with the crime of attempted sec-
ond degree murder (voluntary manslaughter).2 The issue has re-
mained relatively dynamic due to a slowly developing homicide
statute. Recently, in People v. Lopez,3 the Supreme Court of Illinois
considered the issue within the context of the latest statutory amend-
ments and eradicated that crime from the current law of Illinois. In
her dissenting opinion, Justice McMorrow borrowed the words of
Professor Timothy P. O'Neill, a renowned criminal law scholar, to il-
lustrate the deplorable result of the supreme court's opinion.4
Although the illustration originated fourteen years ago in a distinct
homicide law environment, Professor O'Neill's hypothetical serves as
an accurate example of the new void in Illinois homicide law. Accord-
ingly, this Note begins with that illustration.
Professor O'Neill based his illustration on an argument between
two friends, Kane and Abel, which becomes physical.5 After a drawn
out altercation, Kane strangles Abel, breaking his neck. The police
arrive shortly thereafter and arrest Kane. An hour later, Kane's law-
yer arrives at the station.6
'I'm afraid I have some bad news.'
'You mean Abel died?'
'No, the bad news is that Abel did not die.'
'I don't understand.'
'If he had died, there is no question that you would have been
charged with [second degree murder]. He's alive, however, and
there is no such crime as attempt [second degree murder] in Illinois.
You admitted you tried to kill Abel and that is attempt [first degree]
1. 655 N.E.2d 864 (Ill. 1995).
2. 720 ILCS 5/9-2 (West 1993). The 1987 amendments to the Illinois Homicide Code, inter
alia, changed the name of voluntary manslaughter to "second degree murder." 720 ILCS 5/9-2.
3. 655 N.E.2d 864 (I11. 1995).
4. Id. at 869 (McMorrow, J., dissenting) (quoting Timothy P. O'Neill, "With Malice Toward
None": A Solution to an Illinois Homicide Quandary, 32 DEPAUL L. REV. 107, 107-08 (1982)
[hereinafter O'Neill, "With Malice Toward None"]).
5. O'Neill, "With Malice Towards None", supra note 4, at 107.
6. Id.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
murder, a Class X felony punishable by up to thirty years in the
penitentiary. Moreover, because it is a Class X crime, there is no
possibility of probation. Frankly, you made a terrible mistake by
not making sure that you actually killed Abel.' 7
The Supreme Court of Illinois recently injected new lifeblood into
absurd scenarios such as this with its opinion in People v. Lopez.8 Lo-
pez held that there is no offense of attempted second degree murder
in Illinois.9
This Note will examine the foundation upon which the Lopez deci-
sion was built and attempt to illuminate its errors so that future judi-
cial opinions and legislation can remedy the problems it perpetuates.
To that end, Part I of this Note begins with a discussion of the nature
and origin of criminal attempt and second degree murder (voluntary
manslaughter).' 0 Part I continues with the specific development of
the offense of second degree murder (voluntary manslaughter) in
Illinois."
Part I also includes a discussion of the cases which exemplify the
recent split in Illinois District Court opinions, with respect to the lat-
est statutory amendments in 1987, which led to the supreme court's
opinion in Lopez.12 Part I concludes with the first Illinois supreme
court interpretation of the 1987 revised Criminal Code in People v.
Jeffries.1 3 Part II discusses the only other supreme court interpreta-
tion of the current Illinois Criminal Code, the subject opinion of this
Note, People v. Lopez.' 4
The analysis presented in Part III challenges the judicial interpreta-
tions of the Illinois homicide statute which have been commonplace
since the 1961 amendments.' 5 The author argues that those erroneous
interpretations scarred the homicide jurisprudence of Illinois and
7. Id.
8. 655 N.E.2d 864 (I11. 1995).
9. See infra notes 141-83 and accompanying text (discussing the Lopez opinion).
10. See infra notes 21-43 and accompanying text (discussing the crimes of attempt and second
degree murder/voluntary manslaughter).
11. See infra notes 44-94 and accompanying text (exploring the development of second degree
murder in Illinois).
12. See infra notes 97-123 and accompanying text (examining the case law split which pre-
ceded the Illinois supreme court's decision in People v. Lopez).
13. 646 N.E.2d 587 (Ill. 1995). In Jeffries, the court determined that the latest statutory revi-
sions are constitutional and declared an end to some of the ambiguities that had been addressed
in previous lower court opinions. See infra notes 124-40 and accompanying text (presenting a
thorough discussion of Jeffries).
14. 655 N.E.2d 864 (I11. 1995); see infra notes 141-83 and accompanying text (discussing the
Lopez decision).
15. See infra notes 202-22 and accompanying text (challenging the Illinois judicial interpreta-
tions of the homicide statute).
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served as the foundation for the Lopez decision.16 The analysis then
focuses on some of those errors as they are specifically repeated in the
Lopez decision.17
Part IV of this Note explores the impact of the Lopez opinion, giv-
ing special attention to the absence of satisfactory alternatives to the
crime of attempted second degree murder. 18 This Note concludes that
the Lopez decision constitutes the inevitable culmination of the erro-
neous judicial interpretations preceding it.19 However, the author
suggests that the problems perpetuated by the Lopez decision can be
easily remedied through judicial or legislative action.20
I. BACKGROUND
This section discusses the origin of attempt crimes and second de-
gree murder (voluntary manslaughter) in general as well as their spe-
cific application in Illinois law. Although the law of attempt in Illinois
has remained quite constant, there has been considerable statutory
change in Illinois homicide law. This section highlights those changes
and discusses the effects that they have had on Illinois jurisprudence.
In particular, this section focuses on the Illinois courts' treatment of
the most recent amendments to the homicide statute.
A. The Law of Attempt
1. History and Origin
The crime of attempt is a fairly new development of the common
law.21 In medieval times, courts, on rare occasions, convicted those
who were unsuccessful in their attempt to perform a heinous felony.22
They did so based upon the doctrine of "voluntas reputabitur pro
facto-the intention is to be taken for the deed. '' 23 Notwithstanding
these rare occurrences, the modern theory of criminal attempt was
16. See infra notes 202-22 and accompanying text (arguing that the Lopez decision was built
upon the prior erroneous interpretations of the Illinois homicide statute).
17. See infra part III (analyzing the Lopez court's interpretation of the "specific offense" lan-
guage in the attempt statute, its reliance on Reagan's finding that the intent to kill is insufficient
to establish criminal attempt, and its finding that the absence of attempted second degree mur-
der is not fundamentally unfair).
18. See infra notes 247-52 and accompanying text (discussing offenses alternative to attempted
second degree murder).
19. See infra part V (presenting the author's conclusions).
20. See infra part V (presenting the author's suggested remedies).
21. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AusTN W. Scorr, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 495 (1986).
22. Id. at 495-96.
23. Id.
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probably derived from the Court of Star Chamber,24 which had occa-
sion to deal with many offenses tantamount to modern-day attempt
crimes. 25 However, the doctrine of criminal attempt was not clearly
established until many years after the abolition of the Star Chamber,2 6
when in 1801, in the case of Rex v. Higgins, the court noted: "All
offenses of a public nature, that is, all such acts or attempts as tend to
the prejudice of the community, are indictable. '27
One reason for punishing criminal attempts is to allow law enforce-
ment officials to prevent a crime before it is completed.2 8 However,
such a rationale does not adequately further criminal law objectives. 29
That is, as observed in one esteemed treatise, "[t]he primary purpose
in punishing attempts is not to deter the commission of completed
crimes, but rather to subject to corrective action those individuals who
have sufficiently manifested their dangerousness. ' 30
2. Attempt in Illinois
The Illinois attempt statute has long provided: "A person commits
an attempt when, with intent to commit a specific offense, he does any
act which constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of that
offense. '"31 Thus, criminal attempt requires "the intent to do certain
proscribed acts or to bring about a certain proscribed result, rather
24. The Star Chamber was a court originally created to correct "the manifest defects and
shortcomings of the common law courts." Id.
25. Id. (citing JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 567 (2d ed. 1960)).
26. LAFAVE & ScoT'r, supra note 21, at 496. "Most likely the development of the crime of
attempt was retarded by the fact that other means often existed for dealing with unsuccessful or
incomplete criminal schemes. Of particular significance is the accelerated growth of the aggra-
vated assault type of crime during this period." Id. (citations omitted). Many Criminal Codes
today still include crimes that are arguably attempt-type crimes. For example, possession crimes
are probably codified since possession is perceived to be a likely "step toward the doing of
harm." Id. at 497.
27. Id. (quoting Rex v. Higgins, 2 East 5 (1801)).
28. Id. at 498-99.
29. Id. For instance, the "stop and frisk" doctrine can already be said to accomplish that goal
to a certain degree. Id.
30. Id. at 495; see State v. Robinson, 643 A.2d 591, 594-95 (N.J. 1994) (acknowledging that the
New Jersey attempt statute was enacted in order to punish those who are disposed to commit a
crime as well as those who failed to complete a crime solely due to their misfortune in carrying it
out).
31. 720 ILCS 5/8-4(a) (West 1996). Although this definition is "less expansive than ... the
contents of Model Penal Code's § 5.01, which defines attempt, under which other jurisdictions
have recognized the crime of attempt second degree murder," it does contain the critical ele-
ments: "the existence of the requisite mens rea to commit a specific offense plus the occurrence
of a substantial step toward the commission of the specific offense." Timothy P. O'Neill & James
N. Perlman (On behalf of the Illinois Attorneys for Criminal Justice), Brief and Argument for
Amicus Curiae on Behalf of the Petition for Rehearing of People v. Lopez 18-19 (1995); see
MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 (1962) ("A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if,
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than an intent to engage in criminality. '32 Therefore, even if a person
intentionally sought to engage in what he perceived to be unlawful
conduct, he is not guilty of an attempt if that conduct is not an "of-
fense" proscribed by law.33 On the other hand, a person is not ex-
cused if he is unaware that the intended conduct would constitute a
criminal offense; ignorance of the law is no excuse. 34
Furthermore, Illinois courts are unwavering in their requirement
that a specific intent to commit an offense be proven in order to estab-
lish an attempt crime. 35 "[S]pecific intent is most generally understood
to mean 'some intent in addition to the intent to do the physical act
which the crime requires.' "36 In other words, a specific intent is the
desire to effectuate a particular result. This specific intent, however,
may be proven by either direct or circumstantial evidence. 37
B. Voluntary Manslaughter/Second Degree Murder
1. History and Origin
The crime of voluntary manslaughter dates back to the common law
of England. 38 "[V]oluntary manslaughter appears to be essentially a
legal compromise between murder and exoneration, recognizing but
not excusing a human weakness consisting of an intense (or irresisti-
ble) passion caused by serious provocation, resulting in homicide. ' 39
In fact, the crime of manslaughter was created out of necessity; it ena-
bled the arm of the law to reach those wrongful killings that fell
outside of the definition of murder.40 Specifically, "provocation man-
acting with the kind of culpability [i.e., mens rea] otherwise required for the commission of the
crime, he .... ).
32. LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 21, at 500.
33. Id. "Offense" in Illinois is defined as "a violation of any penal statute of this state." 720
ILCS 5/2-12 (West 1993). "Offense" also includes "conduct which if performed in another state
would be criminal by the laws of that State and which conduct if performed in this State would
be an offense under the laws of this State." 720 ILCS 5/8-6 (West 1993).
34. See LAFAVE & Scor, supra note 21, at 500 (stating that "it would make no difference
that the defendant engaged in an attempt without knowledge that his intended result would be a
crime").
35. JOHN F. DECKER, ILLINOIS CRIMINAL LAW: A SURVEY OF CRIMES AND DEFENSES 160
(1st ed. 1986) (citing People v. Weeks, 230 N.E.2d 12 (I11. App. Ct. 1967)).
36. JoHN F. DECKER, ILLINOIS CRIMINAL LAW: A SURVEY OF CRIMES AND DEFENSES 2-42
(2d ed. 1993) (citations omitted).
37. See DECKER, supra note 35, at 161-62 (discussing Illinois case law which demonstrates the
use of direct or circumstantial evidence).
38. Joshua Dressier, Rethinking Heat of Passion: A Defense in Search of a Rationale, 73 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421, 422-23 (1982).
39. 720 ILCS 5/9-2 1961, committee comments 481 (revised 1972) (West 1993).
40. DECKER, supra note 35, at 192. It has been stated that "[p]assion/provocation manslaugh-
ter is an intentional homicide committed under extenuating circumstances that mitigate the mur-
der." State v. Robinson, 643 A.2d 591, 594 (N.J. 1994). Of course, voluntary manslaughter is
1996]
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slaughter" was created under the common law of England in order to
avoid the death penalty, which was mandatory in all cases of murder.41
Of course, today, mandatory death penalties have been abolished.42
Provocation manslaughter, however, is still a distinct facet of homicide
law as "a concession to the frailty of man, a recognition that the aver-
age person can understandably react violently to a sufficient wrong
and hence some lesser punishment is appropriate. ' 43 The develop-
ment of the Illinois statutory law of voluntary manslaughter is dis-
cussed below.
2. Voluntary Manslaughter/Second Degree Murder and Criminal
Attempt in Illinois
a. Illinois Criminal Code Pre-1961
Prior to 1961, voluntary manslaughter in Illinois was essentially
"murder minus malice aforethought." 44 In other words, voluntary
manslaughter and murder were mutually exclusive crimes.45 Murder
was defined as "the unlawful killing of a human being... with malice
aforethought, either express or implied. '46 In contrast, manslaughter
readily distinguishable from involuntary manslaughter. Generally, the distinction lies in the dif-
ference between an intentional act causing death and an intentional killing; the latter cannot
result in involuntary manslaughter. ROLLIN MOIS PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL
LAW 83 (3d ed. 1982). That is, involuntary manslaughter is usually a "catch-all" concept covering
all unintentional killings. Id. at 104.
41. Dressier, supra note 38, at 422-423; see infra note 56 (defining provocation manslaughter).
42. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
43. State v. Robinson, 643 A.2d 591, 594 (citations omitted). According to one legal treatise:
It is not the purpose of the law to unbridle human passions. On the contrary, one very
important aim of the criminal law is to induce persons to keep their passions under
proper control. At the same time the law does not ignore the weaknesses of human
nature. Hence as a matter of common law an unlawful killing may even be intentional
and yet of a lower grade than murder.
PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 40, at 84. This analysis applies with as great a force to imperfect
self-defense manslaughter because in that case one subjectively believes that the need for self-
defense is necessary pursuant to a perceived attack by another on his person. Thus, that attack is
akin to provocation. See infra note 57 (defining imperfect self-defense voluntary manslaughter).
44. O'Neill, "With Malice Toward None", supra note 4, at 113.
45. People v. Jeffries, 646 N.E.2d 587, 594 (11. 1995).
46. O'Neill, "With Malice Toward None", supra note 4, at 109-10 (quoting ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, para. 358 (1959) (emphasis added)). Express malice was defined as "the deliberate intention
unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow creature." Id. at 110 (quoting ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
para. 358 (1959)). Implied malice existed "[w]hen no provocation appeared or when the killing
showed an abandoned or malignant heart." Id. (quoting ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 358
(1959)).
Although the statute, as enacted, adequately reflected society's view of murder as a premedi-
tated act, the common law of Illinois gradually began to recognize an expanded definition of
murder. Id. at 110. Indeed, malice aforethought eventually shifted from a prerequisite to mur-
der to a rubber-stamp categorization ascribed to any act later found to fit within the newly
broadened concept of murder. Id.
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was "the unlawful killing of a human being without malice, express or
implied, and without any mixture of deliberation whatever. '47 It was
based upon this pre-1961 definition of manslaughter that the Supreme
Court of Illinois, in Moore v. People,48 held that assault with intent to
commit manslaughter did not exist because one could not intend to
commit a crime that is itself devoid of deliberation. 49
b. Illinois Criminal Code of 1961
With the enactment of the Illinois Criminal Code of 1961, the
phrase malice aforethought was completely eliminated from the
Code.50 Consequently, as the Supreme Court of Illinois recently ob-
served, "voluntary manslaughter was transformed from murder minus
malice to murder plus mitigation.' ' 51 That is, voluntary manslaughter
and murder were no longer mutually exclusive.5 2 To illustrate, under
the 1961 murder statute, a person merely had to (1) intend to kill or to
cause substantial bodily injury or (2) know that his conduct would
cause or probably cause the same.53
Thus, at common law, malice aforethought covered several categories of mental state: (1) an
intent to kill or injure another; (2) knowledge that one's acts will kill or injure another; (3)
knowledge that one's acts will probably kill or injure another; (4) an unintentional killing of an
officer while resisting him; (5) felony-murder. The three latter categories became known as im-
plied malice. 720 ILCS 5/9-1, committee comments 9 (revised 1972) (West 1993).
47. O'Neill, "With Malice Toward None", supra note 4, at 110 (quoting ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
para. 361 (1959)) (emphasis added).
48. 35 N.E. 166 (I11. 1893).
49. Id. at 167. The Moore court determined that the crime of "assault with intent to commit
murder, rape, mayhem, robbery, larceny ... 'or other felony"' could only include those other
felonies that required an element of deliberate intent since all of the listed offenses required the
same. Id. at 166. However, the act of voluntary manslaughter, by definition, is void of delibera-
tion. Id. at 167. The court then stated:
When it appears there was an intent to take life, either express or implied, where the
killing would not be excusable or justifiable, and an assault is made with that intent,
then it would be an assault with intent to commit murder. It would follow, therefore,
that for one to assault with intent to commit manslaughter would be a contradiction in
terms.
Id. (citation omitted).
50. O'Neill, "With Malice Toward None", supra note 4, at 111-12. "Because the term 'malice
aforethought' was not susceptible to clear definition, the legislature eliminated any reference to
it in the definition of murder in the new [1961] criminal code." People v. Jeffries, 646 N.E.2d
587, 594 (I11. 1995).
51. Jeffries, 646 N.E.2d at 595.
52. Id. at 594. The court stated that "[b]y eliminating the requirement of malice, the drafters
of the new Code removed the element that distinguished the crimes of murder and voluntary
manslaughter." Id.
53. ILL REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1(a) (Smith-Hurd 1985). A person also committed murder
when his victim died while the defendant was engaged in a forcible felony.
A person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits murder if, in per-
forming the acts which cause the death:
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Similarly, the new voluntary manslaughter statute required that the
perpetrator have the intent or knowledge that his acts would result in
death.54 The statute also provided that those acts must be accompa-
nied by one of two mitigating factors.55 Thus, there were now two
prongs of voluntary manslaughter. The first, provocation voluntary
manslaughter, occurred when one acted in the heat of passion.56 The
second, imperfect self-defense voluntary manslaughter, occurred
when one harbored the unreasonable belief that he acted in self de-
fense.57 Just as under the previous statute, the State had to prove all
of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, including the
mitigating factors.5 8
Long after the enactment of the Criminal Code of 1961, there con-
tinued to be a lack of clear understanding as to its import and effect.
59
(1) He either intends to kill or do great bodily harm to that individual or another, or
knows that such acts will cause death to that individual or another; or
(2) He knows that such acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm
to that individual or another; or
(3) He is attempting or committing a forcible felony other than voluntary
manslaughter.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1(a) (Smith-Hurd 1985).
54. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-2 (Smith-Hurd 1985); see supra note 208 (demonstrating
that even though paragraph 9-2(a) of the Code, provocation voluntary manslaughter, does not
mention a specific mental state, the mental state required can be no less than intent or
knowledge).
55. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-2 (Smith-Hurd 1985).
56. ILL REV. STAT. ch. 38 para. 9-2(a) (Smith-Hurd 1985). Provocation voluntary manslaugh-
ter occurred when "[a] person who kills an individual without lawful justification ... at the time
of the killing ... is acting under a sudden and intense passion." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 para. 9-
2(a); see infra note 208 (demonstrating that although this portion of the voluntary manslaughter
statute recites no mental state, the mental state required can be no less than intent or
knowledge).
57. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-2(b) (Smith-Hurd 1985). Imperfect self-defense voluntary
manslaughter involves "[a] person who intentionally or knowingly kills an individual ... [who] at
the time of the killing.., believes the circumstances to be such that, if they existed, would justify
or exonerate the killing.., but his belief is unreasonable." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 para. 9-2(b).
In contrast, the Illinois codification of the affirmative defense of self-defense provides:
A person is justified in the use of force against another when and to the extent that he
reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to defend himself or another against
such other's imminent use of unlawful force. However, he is justified in the use of force
which is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm only if he reasonably
believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to
himself or another, or the commission of a forcible felony.
720 ILCS 5/7-1 (West 1993).
58. People v. Jeffries, 646 N.E.2d 587, 591 (Ill. 1995); see Judge Robert J. Steigmann, First and
Second Degree Murder in Illinois, 75 ILL. B. J. 494, 494 (1987) (stating that the 1961 Homicide
Code placed the burden of proving the elements of murder, as well as the mitigating factors of
voluntary manslaughter, on the State).
59. See Timothy P. O'Neill, An Analysis of Illinois' New Offense of Second Degree Murder, 20
J. MARSHALL L. REV. 209, 214-16 (1986) [hereinafter O'Neill, Second Degree Murder] (arguing
234
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In particular, legal scholars disagreed with the courts' interpretations
of the new Code.60 One commentator, Professor Timothy P. O'Neill,
contended that "Illinois courts took little notice of the major new
Criminal Code revisions in the area of homicide. '61 Professor O'Neill
noted that in 1982, at least one district in Illinois still recognized "mal-
ice" as an element of murder.6 2 He further observed that in 1982,
Illinois appellate courts could not explain why a jury may consider the
crime of voluntary manslaughter even after the defendant was found
guilty of murder.63 Moreover, in 1984, the Second District of Illinois
failed to recognize that a prosecution for voluntary manslaughter after
an acquittal on murder would illegally place a defendant in double
jeopardy.64 Finally, in 1985, the Supreme Court of Illinois still consid-
ered voluntary manslaughter a lesser included offense of murder.65
that the 1961 Code transformed voluntary manslaughter so that it was no longer a lesser in-
cluded offense of murder since voluntary manslaughter required more elements than murder,
not less; that the state of mind for heat of passion voluntary manslaughter had been clarified as
not being something less than intentional; and that the new statute failed to define the burden of
proof with regard to the mitigating circumstances of voluntary manslaughter). O'Neill found the
1961 Code unclear as to who would bear the burden of proof and what standard of proof was
required. Id. But see People v. Reddick, 526 N.E. 2d 141, 145 (I11. 988) (referring to the miti-
gating factors of second degree murder as "mental states ... of lesser culpability"); People v.
Hoffer, 478 N.E.2d 335, 339-40 (I11. 985) (referring to voluntary manslaughter as a "lesser in-
cluded offense" of murder).
60. See, e.g., Joshua Sachs, Is Attempt to Commit Voluntary Manslaughter a Possible Crime?,
71 ILL B. J. 166 (1982) (arguing that People v. Weeks, 230 N.E.2d 12 (Ill. App. Ct. 1967), was in
error and that Illinois should recognize attempted voluntary manslaughter based on both imper-
fect self-defense and heat of passion); O'Neill, "With Malice Toward None", supra note 4, at 117-
18 (same).
61. O'Neill, Second Degree Murder, supra note 59, at 216. "[I]t is apparent that the elimina-
tion of malice aforethought by the Illinois legislature has had little effect on the day-to-day work-
ings of the judiciary." O'Neill, "With Malice Toward None", supra note 4, at 114.
62. O'Neill, Second Degree Murder, supra note 59, at 216 (citing People v. Barney, 444 N.E.2d
518, 522 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982)). This recognition of malice as an element of murder was clearly
error since "malice" had been eliminated from the Code in 1961. See supra notes 53, 56-57 and
accompanying text (quoting the murder and voluntary manslaughter provisions of the Homicide
Code).
63. O'Neill, Second Degree Murder, supra note 59, at 216-17 (citing People v. Pastorino, 414
N.E.2d 54, 58 (tI1. App. Ct. 1980), rev'd, 435 N.E.2d 1144, 1149 (I11. 982)). Since voluntary
manslaughter was now "murder plus mitigation," the two crimes (murder and voluntary man-
slaughter) would be considered in sequence. People v. Jeffries, 646 N.E.2d 587, 597-98 (I11.
1995).
64. O'Neill, Second Degree Murder, supra note 59, at 217 (citing People v. Krogul, 450 N.E.2d
20 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1007 (1984)). Clearly, since the two crimes were
now the same, they could not be prosecuted separately for the same set of facts since such would
result in double jeopardy. See DECKER, supra note 35, at 728 (discussing the doctrine of double
jeopardy).
65. Id. at 217 (citing People v. Hoffer, 478 N.E.2d 335, 339 (I11. 985)); see Jeffries, 646 N.E.2d
at 595 (stating that "second degree murder [and voluntary manslaughter before it] is not a lesser
included offense of murder" since such is established when a crime includes a less culpable
mental state); People v. Howard, 397 N.E.2d 877, 881 (I11. App. Ct. 1979) ("Section 2-9 of the
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The first case to address the issue of whether attempted voluntary
manslaughter would be recognized in Illinois was People v. Weeks. 6
The Weeks court held that there was no offense of attempted provoca-
tion voluntary manslaughter.67 In so doing, it relied on the reasoning
in Moore v. People68 and a New York case, People v. Brown.69 Of
course, Moore was based on the previous Illinois homicide statute,70
while Brown was based on a New York statute defining manslaughter
as homicide "without a design to effect death."' 71 The Weeks court
noted the Brown court's ruling that there could not be an attempt to
commit manslaughter as that crime involved no intent.72
The Weeks court reasoned that attempt crimes require a specific in-
tent. It stated, "[the act that constitutes the attempt must result from
some calculation on the part of the accused.",73 The court noted, how-
ever, that provocation voluntary manslaughter obviates any calcula-
tion because it occurs pursuant to a sudden and intense passion.74
That is, "[tihe passion engendered by the provocation must be suffi-
ciently intense to vitiate the normal, self-imposed controls against the
criminal act."'75 Therefore, the court ruled that it was impossible to
intend to act with such passion. Even though the Weeks ruling has
Criminal Code of 1961, which defines 'included offense,' has been interpreted to mean that an
offense is a lesser included offense only if the greater offense charged contains all of the ele-
ments of the lesser included offense plus some additional elements." (citation omitted)). Of
course, first and second degree murder have identical mental states. Jeffries, 646 N.E.2d at 595.
66. 230 N.E.2d 12 (Ill. App. Ct. 1967).
67. Id. at 14; see supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text (discussing the two forms of volun-
tary manslaughter in Illinois-provocation and imperfect self-defense).
68. 35 N.E. 166 (Ill. 1893); see supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text (discussing the Moore
decision, which was based on the pre-1961 Illinois Criminal Code provisions).
69. People v. Weeks, 230 N.E.2d 12, 14 (11. App. Ct. 1967) (citing People v. Brown, 249
N.Y.S.2d 922 (1964)).
70. See infra notes 46-49 and accompanying text (discussing the pre-1961 homicide statute and
the Moore decision's interpretation thereof).
71. Weeks, 230 N.E.2d at 14 (quoting NEW YORK PENAL LAW, Consol. Laws, § 40, pars. 1050,
1052).
72. Id. (citing People v. Brown, 249 N.Y.S.2d 922 (1964)).
73. Id.
74. Id.; see supra note 56 (explaining provocation voluntary manslaughter in Illinois).
75. Id. But see People v. Jeffries, 646 N.E.2d 587, 594-95 (11. 1995) (noting that the mental
states required for the crimes of murder and voluntary manslaughter have been the same since
1961).
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been criticized by legal scholars7 6 and rejected by other states,7 7 it is
still followed in Illinois.78
In 1983, the Supreme Court of Illinois, in People v. Reagan,7 9
sounded the final death knell for attempted voluntary manslaughter in
Illinois when it ruled that there is no crime of attempted voluntary
manslaughter based on an imperfect self-defense.80 The court rea-
soned that the intent to kill, in and of itself, is not a crime.8' Hence,
the attempt statute must be read to mandate that one intend to kill
without lawful justification, since the statute only prohibits one to act
with the intent to commit an offense.82 Of course, a person who com-
mitted imperfect self-defense voluntary manslaughter actually be-
lieved his actions were justified. Thus, according to the court, he does
not intend to kill without lawful justification because to act in self-
defense is not a crime.83 The court also noted that "it is impossible to
intend an unreasonable belief" such as that required to sustain an im-
perfect self-defense.8 4 Finally, the court focused on the specific intent
required of attempt crimes.85 It concluded that voluntary manslaugh-
76. See, e.g., LAFAVE & Sco-r, supra note 21, at 502 (arguing that Weeks was incorrectly
decided); O'Neill, "With Malice Toward None", supra note 4, at 115-18 (criticizing the Weeks
court for not fully recognizing that malice aforethought had been eliminated from the Code, thus
making murder and voluntary manslaughter essentially the same crime); Sachs, supra note 60, at
167-70 (arguing that Weeks was incorrectly decided).
77. See Sachs, supra note 60, at 167-69 (citing cases from California, Florida, Indiana, Louisi-
ana, Massachusetts, Michigan, and Utah, which have declined to follow Weeks).
78. O'Neill, "With Malice Toward None", supra note 4, at 118; see, e.g., People v. Stevenson,
555 N.E.2d 1074, 1078-79 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (citing Weeks for the proposition that there can be
no attempted second degree murder based on a sudden and intense passion).
79. 457 N.E.2d 1260 (Il. 1983).
80. Id. at 1261; see supra note 57 (explaining imperfect self-defense voluntary manslaughter in
Illinois).
81. Reagan, 457 N.E.2d at 1261 (relying on People v. Barker, 415 N.E.2d 404 (Ill. 1980), for
the proposition that attempted voluntary manslaughter involves more than an intent to kill,
which by itself is not unlawful).
82. Id. "There is no such criminal offense as an attempt to achieve an unintended result." Id.
(quoting People v. Viser, 343 N.E.2d 903, 910 (Il1. 1975)). The Illinois supreme court in Reagan
quoted, with approval, language from the appellate court opinion: "If a defendant intended to
kill with the knowledge that such action was unwarranted, he has intended to kill without lawful
justification and could be prosecuted for attempted murder." Id. at 1262 (citing People v. Rea-
gan, 444 N.E.2d 742 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983)).
83. Id. at 1261-62.
84. Id. at 1262 (citing People v. Reagan, 444 N.E.2d 742 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983)). In Reagan, the
State had argued "the more logical interpretation [of the attempt statute] is that a defendant
must intend to kill but that his intent must be accompanied by the subjective (yet unreasonable)
belief that the killing is justified." Id. at 1261.
85. Id. at 1261-62. The court was compelled to address this issue upon facing the State's ap-
peal to logic. The State argued that since one can receive a conviction for voluntary manslaugh-
ter when his victim dies, it logically follows that when the same victim lives, the defendant should
be convicted of attempted voluntary manslaughter. Id.
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ter cannot be attempted since that crime has long been recognized as
not involving a specific intent.86
b. Illinois Criminal Code of 1987
Four years later, in 1987, the Illinois legislature once again revised
the provisions for murder87 and voluntary manslaughter 88 in the Crim-
inal Code. "Murder" became "First Degree Murder," but retained its
previous elements.89 It was changed in order "to distinguish it from
and to show the relationship to the new offense of second degree mur-
der." 90 "Voluntary Manslaughter" became "Second Degree Mur-
der"91 and now reads:
(a) A person commits the offense of second degree murder when he
commits the offense of first degree murder as defined in paragraphs(1) or (2) of subsection (a) of Section 9-1 of this Code and either of
the following mitigating factors are present:
(1) At the time of the killing he is acting under a sudden and
intense passion resulting from serious provocation by the individual
killed or another whom the offender endeavors to kill, but he negli-
gently or accidentally causes the death of the individual killed; or
(2) At the time of the killing he believes the circumstances to be
such that, if they existed, would justify or exonerate the killing
under the principles stated in Article 7 of this Code, but his belief is
unreasonable.
86. Id. at 1262. About whether manslaughter can be the object of an attempt crime, Professor
John F. Decker commented:
With respect to involuntary manslaughter, there is clear logic for this position: since
intent to kill is not an element of involuntary manslaughter, and since involuntary man-
slaughter by its very nature could not arise where there is an intent to kill-because
intent to kill brings into play murder or voluntary manslaughter-there could be no
attempted involuntary manslaughter. The specific intent required of the criminal at-
tempt-the intent to take life-clashes with the involuntary nature of this category of
manslaughter. On the other hand, it would appear logical to have a crime of attempted
voluntary manslaughter ....
DECKER, supra note 35, at 167 (citations omitted). For a brief discussion of "specific intent" see
supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
87. Compare 720 ILCS 5/9-1 (West 1996) with ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1 (Smith-Hurd
1987).
88. Compare 720 ILCS 5/9-2 (West 1993) with ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-2 (Smith-Hurd
1987).
89. Compare 720 ILCS 5/9-1 (West 1996) with ILL REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1 (Smith-Hurd
1987).
90. Steigmann, supra note 58, at 494.
91. Compare 720 ILCS 5/9-2 (West 1993) with ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-2 (Smith-Hurd
1987); see Steigmann, supra note 58, at 494 (explaining the changes in going from voluntary
manslaughter to second degree murder).
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(b) Serious provocation is conduct sufficient to excite an intense
passion in a reasonable person.92
Second degree murder also requires that once the State has met its
burden of proving the elements of first degree murder beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, the defendant bears the burden of proving one of the
mitigating factors. 93 The defendant must establish and prove the
existence of the applicable mitigating circumstance by a preponder-
ance of the evidence.94
Some legal scholars anticipated that the 1987 homicide statute
would allow for attempted second degree murder (voluntary man-
slaughter) in Illinois.95 In particular, they argued that the change of
names would emphasize the 1961 amendments, which also accommo-
dated such an offense. 96 Indeed, several Illinois appellate courts have
recently recognized attempted second degree murder.
C. Illinois Appellate Courts Recognizing Attempted Second
Degree Murder
Subsequent to the enactment of the Criminal Code of 1987, some
Illinois appellate courts recognized the existence of attempted second
92. 720 ILCS 5/9-2 (West 1993). "The only circumstances which constitute 'serious provoca-
tion' under Illinois law are substantial physical injury or assault, mutual quarrel or combat, ille-
gal arrest, and adultery with the defendant's spouse." People v. Lopez, 655 N.E.2d 864, 872 (Ill.
1995) (McMorrow, J., dissenting). Senate Bill 522, which was enacted into the new second de-
gree murder statute, was drafted by Judge Robert J. Steigmann and it was based on Professor
Timothy P. O'Neill's article, "Murder Least Foul": A Proposal to Abolish Voluntary Manslaugh-
ter in Illinois, 72 ILL. B. J. 306 (1984) [hereinafter O'Neill, "Murder Least Foul"]. Steigmann,
supra note 58, at 494.
93. Section 5/9-2 of the Illinois Criminal Code provides:
When a defendant is on trial for first degree murder and evidence of either of the
mitigating factors defined in subsection (a) of this Section has been presented, the bur-
den of proof is on the defendant to prove either mitigating factor by a preponderance
of the evidence before defendant can be found guilty of second degree murder. How-
ever, the burden of proof remains on the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
each of the elements of first degree murder and, when appropriately raised, the absence
of circumstances at the time of the killing that would justify or exonerate the killing
under the principles stated in Article 7 of this Code. In a jury trial for first degree
murder in which evidence of either of the mitigating factors defined in subsection (a) of
this Section has been presented and the defendant has requested that the jury be given
the option of finding the defendant guilty of second degree murder, the jury must be
instructed that it may not consider whether the defendant has met his burden of proof
with regard to second degree murder until and unless it has first determined that the
State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt each of the elements of first degree
murder.
720 ILCS 5/9-2 (West 1993).
94. 720 ILCS 5/9-2 (West 1993).
95. See infra notes 191-96 and accompanying text (discussing the views of Professor O'Neill
and Judge Steigmann).
96. Id.
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degree murder. For example, in People v. Moore,97 the Third Judicial
District held that there is a crime of attempted second degree murder
based on a sudden and intense passion.98 The court noted that con-
trary to the procedures required by the 1961 statute, the prosecutor
must now prove the elements of first degree murder before the miti-
gating circumstances-here, sudden and intense passion-are consid-
ered.99 Therefore, attempted second degree murder is proven when
the evidence shows that there was a specific intent to kill, but that the
killing was the result of provocation.100 The specific intent required of
attempt crimes is not related to the mitigating factors.101 The court
thus explicitly rejected the applicability of People v. Weeks to the re-
vised statute.10 2
Similarly, in People v. Austin,10 3 the Second Judicial District held
that attempted second degree murder based on an imperfect self-de-
fense is a cognizable crime in Illinois. 104 After reviewing the relevant
current and former homicide statutes, the court addressed the Illinois
supreme court's opinion in People v. Reagan.105 Reagan held that a
crime of attempted imperfect self-defense voluntary manslaughter
would illogically require that one specifically intend an unreasonable
belief in the need for self-defense. 106 Relying on the Third District's
reasoning in People v. Moore-that the intent element is now separate
from the mitigating factors-the court rejected the concurrence's con-
tention that Reagan was still controlling.107
According to the concurrence in Austin, the previous statute also
demanded that the State "first prove each of the elements of murder,"
yet voluntary manslaughter was not considered a specific intent
crime. 108 The majority responded that the concurrence's statutory in-
97. 562 N.E.2d 215 (I11. App. Ct. 1990).
98. Id. at 217.
99. Id.; accord People v. Jeffries, 646 N.E.2d 587, 591 (I11. 995).
100. Moore, 562 N.E.2d at 217.
101. Id.
102. Id. (noting that the Weeks opinion was based on the homicide statute of 1961 and that the
holding in Weeks-that in order for one to attempt voluntary manslaughter, one would have to
intend that a sudden passion exist during the commission of the killing-was inapplicable under
the new statute); see supra notes 66-75 and accompanying text (discussing the Weeks opinion);
supra notes 53, 56-57, 92-93 and accompanying text (quoting the pertinent portions of both the
1961 and 1987 Homicide Codes).
103. 574 N.E.2d 1297 (I11. App. Ct. 1991).
104. Id. at 1304.
105. Id. at 1303; see supra notes 79-86 and accompanying text (discussing the Reagan opinion).
106. People v. Reagan, 457 N.E.2d 1260, 1262 (III. 1983).
107. Austin, 574 N.E.2d at 1303.
108. Id. at 1306 (Nickels, J., concurring). Justice Nickels noted his belief that the new statute
merely "realigned the burden of proof" and renamed the homicide statute. Id. "[T]he legisla-
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terpretation ignored "the fact that the statute was in fact completely
rewritten as well as renamed."'1 9 The court stated, in illustration, that
to obtain an attempted second degree murder conviction, the jury is
initially required to find that the intentional killing was without lawful
justification. 1 0 That is, the defendant's self-defense argument must
first be rejected. At that point, the jury then considers the issue of
mitigation."' Thus, contrary to the prior practice of addressing the
mitigating factors together with the issue of intent, the new statute
requires a two-step process." 2
Finally, although the Fourth District has not evaluated the propriety
of recognizing the existence of attempted second degree murder in
Illinois, a Fourth District court assumed its existence in People v.
Flaugher."3 In Flaugher, the court held that the trial court's at-
tempted second degree murder instructions to the jury were not in
error, even though the defendant argued that they confused the jury
and led to an attempted first degree murder conviction. 14
D. Illinois Appellate Courts Refusing to Recognize Attempted
Second Degree Murder
In contrast, two Illinois Appellate Districts have refused to recog-
nize the existence of attempted second degree murder. In People v.
Williams,115 the First District decided that the crime of attempted sec-
ond degree murder based on an imperfect self-defense does not exist
in Illinois." 6 The court reiterated the reasoning of People v. Reagan
and stated that the new statute did not affect its applicability.117 The
ture neither changed the essential nonspecific nature of the offense of second degree murder nor
diminished the applicability of Reagan ..... Id.; see People v. Aliwoli, 606 N.E.2d 347 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1992) (supporting Justice Nickels' statutory interpretation). The court in Aliwoli cited the
legislative history of the new section to support its position: "We're going to be eliminating the
term 'voluntary manslaughter.' We're going to have murder 1 and murder 2. And what we're
doing, however, is not to change the elements of the offense of voluntary manslaughter, but
we're basically changing the burden of proof to the defendant." Id. at 360 n.4 (quoting 84th Il1.
Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, June 23, 1986, at 72 (statements of Rep. Cullerton)).
109. Austin, 574 N.E.2d at 1303.
110. Id. (further noting that a jury, after rejecting the self-defense claim, could convict based
on the defendant's mistaken belief that he was acting in self-defense).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1304.
113. 598 N.E.2d 391, 399-400 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
114. Id. The court did note the possibility of jury confusion but did not find such a possibility
to be prejudicial to the defendant. Id.
115. 581 N.E.2d 113 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
116. Id. at 116.
117. Id. The court noted that the only real change in the revised statute was that the defend-
ant now carries the burden of proving the existence of the mitigating factors. Id.
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court distinguished the Third District's opinion in People v. Moore
since the offense before it was based on a sudden and intense
passion.118
In People v. Fletcher,1" 9 the Fifth District also refused to recognize
attempted second degree murder based on the unreasonable belief in
the need to use self-defense.' 2 0 The court stated that the only change
in the statute of 1987 was the name and the shifted burden of proof. 12'
Moreover, the court reasoned that the legislature passed the act with
the intention of retaining all of the substantive law related to the of-
fense of voluntary manslaughter. 122 The court applied the reasoning
of People v. Reagan to the new offense of second degree murder to
reach its conclusion that an unreasonable belief in self-defense did not
constitute attempted second degree murder. 23
E. The Illinois Supreme Court's Treatment of the New Homicide
Statute: People v. Jeffries' 24
Recently, the Supreme Court of Illinois addressed the new homi-
cide statute for the first time, albeit in a different context. In People v.
Jeffries, the court held that the new second degree murder statute is
constitutional. 125 The defendants in Jeffries challenged the new Illi-
nois homicide scheme on federal and state due process grounds. 2 6
The court began with the United States Supreme Court's rule ad-
vanced in In re Winship,127 and cases which followed, 28 that "[a] de-
118. Id. (noting that "that decision [People v. Moore] does not have any effect on this case");
see also People v. Cruz, 618 N.E.2d 591 (I11. App. Ct. 1993) (refusing to recognize the existence
of attempted second degree murder based on a imperfect self-defense); People v. Lopez, 614
N.E.2d 329 (I11. App. Ct. 1993) (refusing to recognize the existence of attempted second degree
murder based on sudden and intense passion); People v. Aliwoli, 606 N.E.2d 347 (I11. App. Ct.
1992) (refusing to recognize the existence of attempted second degree murder based on imper-
fect self-defense).
119. 625 N.E.2d 1185 (11. App. Ct. 1993).
120. Id. at 1186.
121. Id. at 1187.
122. Id.
123. Id.; see supra notes 79-86 and accompanying text (discussing the holding of People v.
Reagan).
124. 646 N.E.2d 587 (III. 1995).
125. Id. at 593-94. The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides: "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, with-
out due process of law." U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1. The Jeffries court also determined that
the statute met the requirements of the due process clause of the Illinois Constitution. Jeffries,
646 N.E.2d at 596 (citing ILL. CONsr., art. I, § 2).
126. Jeffries, 646 N.E.2d at 588-89.
127. 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (holding that in order to comport with due process, a State must
prove all of the essential elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt before convicting the
defendant).
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fendant's due process rights are violated when the burden shifts to the
defendant to disprove an element of the [charged] offense."'1 29 How-
ever, the court reasoned that the Fourteenth Amendment does not
preclude a requirement that the defendant prove a mitigating factor in
order to "reduce the severity of a homicide charge.' 130 Thus, the Illi-
nois statutory scheme was found constitutional because the State re-
tains the burden of proof with respect to all of the elements of first
degree murder.131 Even though the defendant must prove an affirma-
tive defense-one of the mitigating factors of second degree murder-
he does so only after the State has successfully made its case for first
degree murder. 132
Furthermore, the Jeffries court ruled that first and second degree
murder have identical mental states. 133 It also found that second de-
gree murder cannot be considered a lesser included offense of murder,
since it does not entail a "less culpable mental state.' 34 Rather, sec-
128. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) (holding that the right to due process is
violated when the defendant is made to bear the burden of disproving an element of an offense);
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) (same).
129. Jeffries, 646 N.E.2d at 592 (citing Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975)). Mullaney
held that Maine's homicide statute was unconstitutional because it required the defendant to
disprove malice, an element of murder, in order to receive a conviction for the lesser offense of
manslaughter. Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 703-04.
130. Jeffries, 646 N.E.2d at 592-93. The Jeffries court referred to Patterson v. New York, 432
U.S. 197 (1977), in its discussion of constitutional issues. Id. The Patterson court held that New
York's statutory scheme was constitutional where it required the defendant to prove the affirma-
tive defense of emotional disturbance in order to receive a conviction for the reduced offense of
manslaughter. A jury could only convict a defendant of second degree murder if it found that all
of the elements of second degree murder existed and that the defendant had not proved his
affirmative defense. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 210. The Jeffries court similarly found that the Illinois
Constitution did not preclude a requirement that the defendant bear the burden of proving a
mitigating factor. Jeffries, 646 N.E.2d at 596.
131. Jeffries, 646 N.E.2d at 594.
132. Id. Thus, the Illinois homicide scheme is clearly distinguishable from that prohibited by
the United States Supreme Court in Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), since the latter
provided that the malice required for a murder conviction could only be rebutted if the defend-
ant proved that he acted in the heat of passion. Id.
133. Id. at 594-95. In ruling that the mental state required for first degree murder is identical
to that required for second degree murder, the court reaffirmed its earlier ruling in People v.
Wright, 488 N.E.2d 973 (Ill. 1986). Id. at 594. The Jeffries court held that Wright had implicitly
overruled its prior decision in People v. Hoffer, 478 N.E.2d 335 (Il1. 1985). Id. The Hoffer court
had "held that the mental states for murder and voluntary manslaughter were 'mutually inconsis-
tent."' Id. at 595 (quoting Hoffer, 478 N.E.2d at 340). The Jeffries court also explicitly rejected
its previous decisions insofar as they described "serious provocation" or "unreasonable belief in
justification" as being less culpable mental states. Id. (citing People v. Reddick, 526 N.E.2d 141,
145 (I11. 1988)).
134. Id.
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ond degree murder is "a lesser mitigated offense of first degree
murder.' 35
The Supreme Court of Illinois also rejected the defendant's claim
that the Illinois statutory scheme unfairly required the defendant to
prove an unreasonable belief in the need to defend himself, after hav-
ing had the burden to prove a reasonable belief for purposes of a self-
defense claim. 136 Rather, the court reasoned, the defendant presents
evidence to establish a claim of self-defense, i.e., that the defendant
subjectively believed self-defense was necessary and that the belief
was reasonable. 137 The fact finder then determines whether the State
has proven the elements of first degree murder and has disproved the
affirmative defense. 138 If the State has proven both, the jury then re-
examines that same evidence to decide whether a conviction of second
degree murder is in order.139 Thus, the court concluded that "a de-
fendant is not forced to argue that his 'belief was unreasonable"' and
the statute does not interfere with a defendant's due process protec-
tion.140 According to Jeffries, then, the 1987 revisions to the Homicide
Code, which modified the crimes of murder and voluntary manslaugh-
ter and called them "First and Second Degree Murder" respectively,
are constitutional as well as legally enforceable.
II. SUBJECT OPINION: PEOPLE V. LOPEZ141
Shortly after its opinion in Jeffries, the Supreme Court of Illinois
decided the case of People v. Lopez. It did so in order to resolve the
split among the lower courts with respect to the existence of the crime
of attempted second degree murder in Illinois, which developed after
the enactment of the 1987 amendments to the Homicide Code. 42 In
Lopez, the court determined that attempted second degree murder
does not exist in Illinois.
135. Id. (emphasis added) (citing People v. Newbern, 579 N.E.2d 583 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991), as
holding: "second degree murder is a lesser offense because its penalties upon conviction are
lesser, and it is a mitigated offense because it is first degree murder plus defendant's proof by a
preponderance of the evidence that a mitigating factor is present").
136. Id. at 596-97.
137. Id. at 597.
138. Id. at 598.
139. Id. at 597.
140. Id.
141. 655 N.E.2d 864 (I11. 1995).
142. Id. at 864-65; see also supra notes 97-123 and accompanying text (discussing the split
among the lower courts and the reasoning adopted by each district).
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A. The Majority Opinion
In People v. Lopez, the Supreme Court of Illinois consolidated the
appeals of Denis Lopez and Juan Cruz. Both criminal defendants
claimed that the trial court had erred in refusing to recognize and in-
struct the jury on the crime of attempted second degree murder. 143
After the First Judicial District of Illinois upheld the trial courts' deci-
sions to deny the proffered instructions and to convict both defend-
ants of attempted first degree murder, the Supreme Court of Illinois
also affirmed. 44
Both defendants claimed, essentially, that had their victims died,
they would be guilty merely of second degree murder, since Lopez
asserted that he acted in the heat of passion145 and Cruz contended
that he had a claim of imperfect self-defense. 146 Of course, all of the
victims lived. Consequently, the defendants asserted that it would be
unfair to punish them for attempted first degree murder because that
crime carried with it a higher minimum penalty as well as a higher
possible maximum penalty than would a second degree murder
conviction. 147
The court began by citing its previous opinion, People v. Reagan,148
which ruled "that the crime of attempted voluntary manslaughter
based upon an imperfect self-defense does not exist in Illinois."'1 49
143. Lopez, 655 N.E.2d at 864.
144. Id. at 864, 868.
145. Id. at 864-65. In December 1989, after two or three years of marital trouble, Lopez's wife
of ten years informed him that she was having an affair and that her lover was the father of their
son. Id. at 865. In March 1990, Mrs. Lopez informed Lopez that she was filing for divorce and
later that month she and their children moved in with her mother. Id. On March 22, 1990,
Lopez shot his wife, but she survived the attack. Id.
146. Id. Cruz shot two plain-clothed policemen when they attempted to apprehend him be-
cause he was in the midst of distributing drugs at a housing project. Id. Cruz contended that he
was unaware that the two men were police officers. Id.
147. Id. at 868; see infra notes 225-31 and accompanying text (discussing the penalty structure
in Illinois). Defendant Cruz received thirty years in prison for the attempted first degree murder
conviction. People v. Cruz, 618 N.E.2d 591, 593 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993). Defendant Lopez received
a sentence of twenty-five years in prison for his attempted first degree murder conviction after
that verdict was merged with his conviction for armed violence. People v. Lopez, 614 N.E.2d
329, 334 (11. App. Ct. 1993).
148. See supra notes 79-86 and accompanying text (discussing People v. Reagan, 457 N.E.2d
1260 (I11. 1983)).
149. People v. Lopez, 655 N.E.2d 864, 866 (Ill. 1995) (emphasis added). There is no similar
Illinois Supreme Court ruling for the crime of attempted voluntary manslaughter based on prov-
ocation, although People v. Weeks, 230 N.E.2d 12, 14 (Ill. App. Ct. 1967), which held that there
is no attempted voluntary manslaughter based on a sudden and intense passion, has been fol-
lowed by other district courts. See supra notes 66-78 and accompanying text (discussing the
Weeks opinion and noting those courts which have rejected that opinion as well as those that
have embraced its reasoning).
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The court relied on Reagan's finding that the intent to kill, standing
alone, is not a "specific offense" for purposes of criminal attempt. 150
Instead, a person must intend to kill without lawful justification. 151
The Reagan court had held that in the case of an imperfect self-de-
fense, a person intends to kill another with the subjective, though un-
reasonable, belief that self-defense is necessary; thus, such a
defendant believes his acts were justified, contrary to the requirement
that he intend to kill without lawful justification.152
The court also assessed the pertinent Illinois statutes. 53 According
to the court, the attempt statute provides that "for a defendant to
commit an attempted offense, he must intend to commit a specific of-
fense.' 5 4 The court reasoned that since the offense of second degree
murder is dependent upon the presence of certain mitigating circum-
stances, 155 an offense of attempted second degree murder is an impos-
sibility since one cannot intend that such mitigating factors exist. 56
The court recognized the defendant's suggestion that just as second
degree murder is first degree murder plus mitigating factors, so should
attempted second degree murder be attempted first degree murder
plus mitigating factors. 57 However, the court concluded that the at-
tempt statute specifically requires that a person have the intent to
commit a specific offense, as opposed to having merely the intent to
kill.' 58 Therefore, according to the court, the statute must be applied
differently to the two separate offenses of first and second degree
murder. 59 In so ruling, the court recognized its strictly noninterpre-
tivist stance and suggested that opinions to the contrary be addressed
to the legislature.' 60
150. Lopez, 655 N.E.2d at 866 (quoting Reagan, 457 N.E.2d at 1262).
151. Id. (quoting Reagan, 457 N.E.2d at 1261-62).
152. Id. (quoting Reagan, 457 N.E.2d at 1261-62).
153. Id. at 865-66.
154. Id. at 865-67.
155. Id. at 866-67 (citing People v. Jeffries, 646 N.E.2d 587, 595 (I11. 1995)).
As noted in Jeffries, first and second degree murder are similar in that they have the
same mental states. What distinguishes the two offenses is the presence of the mitigat-
ing circumstance, which reduces first degree murder to second degree murder. How-
ever, the mitigating circumstances are not elements of the crime. In fact, first and
second degree murder have the same elements. Second degree murder is simply a lesser
mitigated offense, a concept new to Illinois.
Id. at 867 (emphasis added).
156. Id. at 867-68.
157. Id. at 867.
158. But cf MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1) (1962) (providing that an attempt is committed
when, "acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for commission of the crime," a
person takes substantial steps toward the commission thereof).
159. Lopez, 655 N.E.2d at 867-68.
160. Id. at 868.
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Finally, the court addressed the defendants' fairness argument. Lo-
pez had argued that without attempted second degree murder they
could be sentenced, unfairly, to a longer prison term.161 The Supreme
Court of Illinois determined that the disparate sentencing guidelines
were not significantly cruel and disproportionate. Therefore, the
court refused to overrule the legislature's chosen penalties based upon
the "Illinois Constitution's requirement that 'all penalties.., be deter-
mined ... according to the seriousness of the offense."1 62
B. The Dissent
In concluding that the crime of attempted second degree murder
does exist in Illinois, the dissent 163 emphasized the disparate treat-
ment that would result from the majority's ruling, especially the lower
sentence available if the defendant's victim fortuitously died as a re-
sult of his actions. 164 Justice McMorrow argued that the existence of
attempted second degree murder is both a logical result of the new
homicide scheme and "consistent with recent case law interpreting the
statute."165
161. Id.; see infra notes 225-31 and accompanying text (discussing the penalty structure in
Illinois).
162. Lopez, 655 N.E.2d at 868 (quoting ILL. CONST., Art. 1, § 11). The court relied on its
opinion in People v. Steppan, 473 N.E.2d 1300 (I11. 1985), which held:
This court has traditionally been reluctant to override the judgment of the General
Assembly with respect to criminal penalties. It indicated at an early date that the con-
stitutional command that "penalties shall be proportioned to the nature of the offense"
would justify interference with the legislative judgment only if the punishment was
"cruel," "degrading" or "so wholly disproportionate to the offense committed as to
shock the moral sense of the community."
Id. at 868 (quoting Steppan, 473 N.E.2d at 1305). Although similar, this is not a "cruel and
unusual punishment" argument based on the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion. Such an analysis is rarely undertaken in relation to the States' chosen penalty structures.
See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 997 (1991) (upholding a mandatory life sentence
for a first-time drug conviction based on a narrow proportionality review, while noting that only
egregious cases of grossly disproportionate sentences will be reviewed).
163. The dissent (and partial concurrence) was written by Justice McMorrow and joined by
Chief Justice Bilandic. Lopez, 655 N.E.2d at 868. Chief Justice Bilandic was the author of the
court's opinion in People v. Jeffries, 646 N.E.2d 587 (I11. 1995).
164. Lopez, 655 N.E.2d at 868-71 (McMorrow, J., dissenting) (noting that not only is there a
lesser sentence imposed if the victim dies, 4 to 20 years versus 6 to 30 years, but a person con-
victed of second degree murder may be eligible for probation whereas probation is not available
for an attempted first degree murder conviction); see infra notes 225-31 and accompanying text
(discussing the Illinois penalty structure). The dissent addressed the majority's argument that
the court should not interfere with the legislature's penalty structure "unless the disparity in
sentencing is 'cruel,' 'degrading' or 'so wholly disproportionate to the offense committed as to
shock the moral sense of the community."' Lopez, 655 N.E.2d at 869 (McMorrow, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted).
165. Lopez, 655 N.E.2d at 868 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
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Justice McMorrow cited various articles, written by proponents of
the 1987 revised homicide statute, that supported her view that the
revisions were aimed at eliminating the previous disparity caused by
the court's ruling in Reagan.166 Although Justice McMorrow noted
that the Reagan decision itself might have been decided wrongly (be-
cause voluntary manslaughter should have also been viewed as "mur-
der plus mitigation"), 167 she emphasized that the 1987 revisions
specifically separated the mitigating circumstances from the elements
of second degree murder.168 In fact, according to the decision in Jef-
fries,169 the factors in mitigation are no longer elements of second de-
gree murder at all. 170 Moreover, "the recently promulgated jury
instructions addressing the new homicide statute,"' 71 which "logically
guide a jury through deliberation on attempted second degree mur-
der," require that a jury first find that the elements of attempted first
degree murder exist, before it examines the mitigating circum-
stances.172 Thus, "the crime of attempted second degree murder
is simply attempted first degree murder plus mitigating
circumstances."1 73
The dissent noted that such a formulation does not compromise the
fact that attempt is a specific intent crime.' 74 Rather, the State still
bears the burden to prove that the defendant specifically intended to
kill; however, that intent requirement is unrelated to the factors ad-
vanced in mitigation.175
166. Id. at 872 (citing Steigmann, supra note 58; O'Neill, Second Degree Murder, supra note
59).
167. Id. at 871 n.1 (McMorrow, J., dissenting). Justice McMorrow stated, however, that "the
commingling of the elements of voluntary manslaughter with the mitigating circumstances in the
statute led courts to interpret the attempt statute as requiring the defendant to have intended
both the elements of the crime and the mitigating circumstances." Id.
168. Id.
169. 646 N.E.2d 587 (Ill. 1995); see supra notes 124-40 and accompanying text (discussing
Jeifries).
170. Lopez, 655 N.E.2d at 870 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
171. Id. at 872 (referring to ILLINOIS PATrERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL, Nos. 6.07Y
(provocation), 6.07Z (belief in justification) (3d ed. 1992)).
172. Id. at 872 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 870-71.
174. Id. at 871.
175. Id. (citing People v. Moore, 562 N.E.2d 215, 217 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)). See generally,
People v. Williams, 649 N.E.2d 397, 403-04 (Ill. 1995) (indicating that the intent element of at-
tempt to commit murder can be shown by the surrounding circumstances); People v. Leger, 597
N.E.2d 586, 606-08 (Ill. 1992) (discussing previous case law finding jury instructions erroneous
where they allowed the jury to find attempted murder based upon definitions of murder other
than that requiring a specific intent to kill-for example, felony murder, knowledge that acts
would result in the death of another-but finding that a conviction for attempted first degree
murder is appropriate in the instant case since the jury "specifically found that defendant in-
tended to kill [his victim]").
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Furthermore, the dissent argued, "[i]t is not logical to conclude that
the legislature intended the mitigating circumstances to reduce the de-
gree of murder, but not attempted murder.' u7 6 Justice McMorrow
concluded that since the legislature clearly intended that the existence
of the statutory mitigating factors would decrease the defendant's cul-
pability for murder, the legislature logically intended the same for at-
tempted murder. Further, it would be irrational for the legislature to
intend that the mitigating factors result in the elimination of a lesser
offense. 177 Thus, under the rules of statutory interpretation, "that no
statute should be construed in a manner which will lead to conse-
quences which are absurd, inconvenient, or unjust,"'1 78 the dissent
found the majority's conclusion to be faulty.179
In sum, the dissent argued that a crime of attempted second degree
murder should be recognized in Illinois since the barriers to doing so,
which may have existed in the Criminal Code of 1961, were elimi-
nated. 180 That is, the mitigating factors required for a second degree
murder conviction are no longer considered elements of the of-
fense. 181 Thus, where before the language of the attempt statute-
requiring an intent to commit a specific offense-may have required
that the defendant intend, illogically, that the mitigating factors be
present, such is no longer the case. Of course, the intent to kill would
continue to be necessary for an attempted second degree murder con-
viction. 182 Finally, the dissent concluded that the majority's statutory
interpretation leads to absurd and fundamentally unfair results, in
contravention of the Illinois Constitution. 83
176. Lopez, 655 N.E.2d at 872 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
177. Id. at 871. In this regard, Justice McMorrow stated:
The result of the majority's interpretation of the attempt and homicide statutes is that
the very circumstance that should mitigate the defendant's conduct, the belief in the
need for self-defense and a lack of intent to commit a specific offense, actually pre-
cludes a conviction of the lesser offense. We are bound to presume that the legislature
did not intend such an absurd result.
Id.
178. Id. (quoting People v. Partee, 530 N.E.2d 460, 463 (Il. 1988)).
179. Id. at 871-72. The dissent concluded that the Cruz court should have instructed the jury
on attempted second degree murder since there existed an issue of fact as to whether "the de-
fendant believed that deadly force was necessary to defend himself." Id. at 873 (referring to
People v. Cruz, 618 N.E.2d 591 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993)). On the other hand, the dissent found that
the Lopez majority had properly denied the defendant's proffered attempted second degree
murder instruction since the act of his wife informing him that she was having an affair did not
amount to "serious provocation" under Illinois law. Id. at 872-73 (referring to People v. Lopez,
614 N.E.2d 329 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993)).
180. Id. at 870.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 871.
183. Id.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
III. ANALYSIS
The case of People v. Lopez was decided wrongly and should be
judicially or legislatively overturned. The Supreme Court of Illinois
based its opinion upon inapplicable and unsound precedent as well as
an unduly strict interpretation of statutory law. Most importantly, and
beyond any argument which endeavors to construe the precise lan-
guage of the law of criminal attempt and second degree murder in
Illinois, Lopez represents a travesty of fairness and logic.
A. The Lopez Court's Reliance on Precedent Was Misplaced
The erroneous use of precedent has long accompanied the Illinois
Criminal Code enactments and might be considered part and parcel
thereof.'84 Indeed, it is the lax interpretive history of the homicide
statutes that has scarred Illinois judicial reasoning to the extent that
the decision in Lopez is not as shocking as it should be.
The Lopez decision centers almost exclusively around the court's
previous opinion in People v. Reagan.8 5 Reagan held that attempted
imperfect self-defense voluntary manslaughter is not a crime in Illi-
nois.186 Reliance upon Reagan is misplaced, however, since that deci-
sion served as an interpretative device for a prior, and arguably quite
different, homicide statute. 8 7 The relevant statute, Illinois Criminal
Code of 1961, upon which the Reagan opinion rested, provided: "A
person who intentionally or knowingly kills an individual commits vol-
untary manslaughter if at the time of the killing he believes the cir-
cumstances to be such that, if they existed, would justify or exonerate
the killing ... but his belief is unreasonable.'188
184. See, e.g., O'Neill, "With Malice Toward None", supra note 4, at 116 (arguing that Moore
v. People, 35 N.E.2d 166 (Ill. 1893), misinterpreted the import of "malice aforethought" because
rather than asking whether one could deliberately intend to commit manslaughter, "the court
should have asked whether one could intend to kill under circumstances negating deliberation,
which would render the intent non-malicious and reduce the crime from murder to manslaugh-
ter."). O'Neill also argued that People v. Weeks, 230 N.E.2d 12 (Ill. App. Ct. 1967), was incor-
rectly decided because the court failed to recognize that the Criminal Code of 1961 erased
"malice aforethought" from its provisions, which meant that "murder no longer possessed [any]
element which provocation manslaughter did not." Id. at 117; see also Sachs, supra note 60, at
170 (arguing that Weeks was erroneously decided).
185. See supra notes 79-86 and accompanying text (discussing People v. Reagan, 457 N.E.2d
1260 (Ill. 1983)).
186. Reagan, 457 N.E.2d at 1261.
187. But see supra note 108 (presenting arguments that the 1987 Code effected little change in
homicide law).
188. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-2(b) (Smith-Hurd 1979).
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The 1987 Criminal Code transformed voluntary manslaughter into
second degree murder. 189 Now, the mitigating factors are clearly sep-
arate from the intent requirement. 90 Moreover, the burden rests
upon the defendant to prove that a mitigating circumstance existed at
the time that he committed the requisite acts.
Both Judge Robert J. Steigmann and Professor Timothy P. O'Neill,
proponents of the new revisions, believed that the new Illinois homi-
cide statute of 1987, in particular its change of names, would act to
establish the crime of attempted second degree murder in Illinois.19'
In fact, O'Neill argued that it was imperative for the courts to recog-
nize and clarify those changes that were instituted in the Criminal
Code of 1961.192
Specifically, O'Neill contended that attempted voluntary man-
slaughter would be a crime in Illinois except for the supreme court's
"perversity" in refusing to recognize the same.193 He then proposed
that "[t]he new names of the offenses will eliminate this anomaly and
clarify the fact that a person can be guilty of either 'attempt first de-
gree murder' or 'attempt second degree murder."'194
Similarly, Judge Steigmann claimed that one of the reasons he in-
cluded the change of names in his draft for the new statute was be-
cause he believed that Professor O'Neill's reasoning was correct-the
new names would emphasize that attempted second degree murder is
a crime in Illinois. 195 He further pointed out that the existence of at-
tempted second degree murder is supported by the fact that the legis-
189. For a complete discussion of the changes instituted by the 1987 amendment to the Illinois
Homicide Code, see supra notes 87-94 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 87-94 and accompanying text (discussing the 1987 amendments).
191. O'Neill, Second Degree Murder, supra note 59, at 223; Steigmann, supra note 58, at 498.
192. O'Neill, "Murder Least Foul", supra note 92, at 308. In order to justify his proposal that
"voluntary manslaughter" be changed to "second degree murder," Professor O'Neill stated:
The murder/manslaughter dichotomy was useful when those crimes were mutually ex-
clusive. Yet what we now call voluntary manslaughter in Illinois is only a statute defin-
ing a less serious form of murder. It would help both courts and juries to jettison the
entire manslaughter terminology, redolent of arcane common law distinctions, in favor
of a more accurate term. "Murder in the second degree" would be a vast improvement.
Id.; see People v. Lopez, 655 N.E.2d 864, 869-70 (Ill. 1995) (McMorrow, J., dissenting) (stating
her belief that the 1987 amendments were aimed at eliminating the disparity caused by the
court's failure to recognize attempted second degree manslaughter under the 1961 Code); Peo-
ple v. Jeffries, 646 N.E.2d 587, 590 (Ill. 1995) ("The intent of the legislature in enacting [the new
homicide statute] was to remedy the confusion and inconsistency that had developed in regard to
the murder and voluntary manslaughter statutes."); see also supra notes 59-65 and accompanying
text (discussing the courts' failure to recognize that the 1961 amendments to the Criminal Code
had substantially changed the law of homicide).
193. O'Neill, Second Degree Murder, supra note 59, at 223.
194. Id.
195. Steigmann, supra note 58, at 498, 511.
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lature heard Professor O'Neill's arguments, as well as those in
opposition to the name change, and yet proceeded to adopt the new
names.
196
Therefore, since Professor O'Neill and Judge Steigmann, whose rec-
ommendations were enacted into the new Code, both believed that
the 1987 revisions would make a difference in the attempted voluntary
manslaughter jurisprudence, there is strong support for such a conclu-
sion. Thus, the Supreme Court of Illinois' continued reliance on the
Reagan decision is erroneous. That opinion was rendered in 1983,
four years prior to the latest changes in the Illinois Homicide Code.
B. Following Unsound Precedent, the Lopez Court Misinterpreted
Statutory Law
One legal scholar, James B. Haddad, stated that even though he
believes the offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter (second de-
gree murder) should exist, the new statute would not affect the
supreme court's reasoning in Reagan.197 Haddad concluded that a
change in the relevant law would occur only pursuant to an attack on
the reasoning of Reagan.198 Accordingly, this Note argues that Rea-
gan itself was incorrectly decided and that the Lopez court errone-
ously relied upon it. That is, even if Reagan's precedential value has
not been disturbed by the 1987 revisions, it is an unsound opinion and
should not have been given any weight by the Lopez court.
The Reagan opinion rested upon two principal conclusions of law.
First, the court ruled that attempted voluntary manslaughter based on
an imperfect self-defense is an impossibility since it requires that one
intend an unreasonable belief.199 Second, the court reasoned that
having an intent to kill, of itself, is not a crime; rather, in order to
commit attempted voluntary manslaughter one would have to intend
to kill without lawful justification.200 The court noted, however, that
an imperfect self-defense means that the defendant intended to "en-
196. Id. Some courts have argued that the legislature explicitly intended that the change of
names would not effect the case law relating to the offense of voluntary manslaughter. People v.
Fletcher, 625 N.E.2d 1185, 1187 (I11. App. Ct. 1993); People v. Cruz, 618 N.E.2d 591, 595 (Iil.
App. Ct. 1993); People v. Timberson, 573 N.E.2d 374, 376-77 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991). However, the
fact that the legislature intended that the case law dealing with the offense of voluntary man-
slaughter remain intact does not directly address the issue of the existence of attempted volun-
tary manslaughter/second degree murder.
197. James B. Haddad, Second Degree Murder Replaces Voluntary Manslaughter in Illinois:
Problems Solved, Problems Created, 19 Loy. U. Cm. L.J. 995, 1022-23 (1988).
198. Id.
199. People v. Reagan, 457 N.E.2d 1260, 1261 (I11. 1983).
200. Id.
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gage in self-defense, which is not a criminal offense."'201 It is upon
these two conclusions that the Lopez opinion depends. The error in
each is discussed below.
1. The Crime of Attempted Second Degree Murder Does Not
Compromise the "Specific Offense" Language of the
Attempt Statute
Following the reasoning in Reagan, the Lopez court strictly con-
strued the attempt statute, which provides that one must intend to
commit a specific offense.202 The court held that one cannot intend to
commit the specific offense203 of second degree murder since it is il-
logical to intend that the requisite mitigating factors be present.2°4
Clearly, the court erred.205 The crime of attempted second degree
murder logically fits within the supreme court's myopic definition of
specific offense. Alternatively, this Note argues that the attempt stat-
ute calls for a looser interpretation of "specific offense" that would
better accommodate attempted second degree murder.
The offense of second degree murder provides that the mitigating
factors be considered separately from the intent requirement and that
the burden to prove one of them be on the defendant. 20 6 Thus, as the
Lopez court itself recognized: "[T]he mitigating circumstances are
not elements of the crime. In fact, first and second degree murder
have the same elements. Second degree murder is simply a lesser mit-
igated offense, a concept new to Illinois. '20 7 Such being the case, the
specific offense of second degree murder is actually first degree mur-
201. Id. at 1262.
202. People v. Lopez, 655 N.E.2d 864, 867 (Ill. 1995).
203. The Illinois Criminal Code defines offense as "a violation of any penal statute of this
State." 720 ILCS 5/2-12 (West 1993). In addition, section 5/8-6 states that "[flor purposes of this
Article, 'offense' shall include conduct which if performed in another state would be criminal by
the laws of that State and which conduct if performed in this State would be an offense under the
laws of this State." 720 ILCS 5/8-6 (West 1993).
204. Lopez, 655 N.E.2d at 867.
205. Cf. Cox v. State, 534 A.2d 1333 (Md. 1988) (finding the existence of attempted voluntary
manslaughter based upon similar terminology). In Cox, the Maryland Court of Appeals ruled
that its common law version of attempt, "intent to commit a particular offense coupled with
some overt act," could be applied to the crime of voluntary manslaughter, "an intentional homi-
cide, done in a sudden heat of passion." Id. at 1335, 1337 (emphasis added).
206. For a complete discussion of the most recent homicide statute, see supra notes 87-96 and
accompanying text.
207. Lopez, 655 N.E.2d at 867 (citing People v. Jeffries, 646 N.E.2d 587, 595 (Ill. 1995)). Of
course, the elements of (first degree) murder and voluntary manslaughter (second degree mur-
der) became identical in 1961. Jeffries, 646 N.E.2d at 594-95.
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der.2 0 8 Only after the elements of first degree murder are proven be-
yond a reasonable doubt does the jury determine whether it will
decrease the defendant's conviction because certain mitigating cir-
cumstances are present.20 9
Therefore, since the mens rea and actus reus required for first and
second degree murder are the same, it is logical to conclude that just
as one can attempt the former, so can one attempt the latter. The
208. The elements of both crimes are now the same. That is, the prosecution must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt, for both murder and voluntary manslaughter, that (1) the defendant
committed the act which caused the victim's death, (2) he knew that such an act would cause
death or great bodily harm or intended the same, and (3) "the defendant was not justified in
using the force which he used." Steigmann, supra note 58, at 497-98. It is now the defendant
who elects to have second degree murder instructions given to the jury. Moreover, the defend-
ant bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that mercy should be given
due to the presence of one of the two mitigating circumstances. As such, the State cannot itself
request second degree murder instructions; moreover, it would appear that, under Mullaney v.
Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), the State is also prohibited from charging a defendant with second
degree murder. Id. at 496. Therefore, "[t]he crime of second degree murder is first degree mur-
der plus mitigating circumstances." Lopez, 655 N.E.2d at 870-71 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
The Lopez majority did not deny this. Justice Nickels proclaimed: "[w]hile they share the same
elements, second degree murder requires the presence of a mitigating circumstance, which, while
not an element or mental state, does reduce the culpability and thus the sentencing range." Id.
at 867-68 (citing People v. Jeffries, 646 N.E.2d 587, 594-95 (III. 1995)).
As a result of the 1961 statutory change, "murder and voluntary manslaughter require identi-
cal mental states-intent or knowledge-as well as an identical result-the unjustified killing of
a human being." O'Neill, "With Malice Toward None", supra note 4, at 113. This was due to the
fact that, with the exception of felony murder, the murder statute now required intent or knowl-
edge, while imperfect self-defense voluntary manslaughter also required either intent or knowl-
edge and provocation voluntary manslaughter did not mention a mental state at all. Id. at 112.
However, when an offense is silent with respect to the mental state required, Illinois law implies
intent, knowledge, or recklessness. Id. at 112-13.
When the Criminal Code of 1961 was drafted, the revision committee responsible for
drafting the Code wisely decided to abandon the myriad of mental states that were
reflected in the code before its passage by the state's General Assembly .... Accord-
ingly, paragraph 5/4-3(a) of the code provides:
Mental State. (a) A person is not guilty of an offense, other than an offense which
involves absolute liability, unless, with respect to each element described by the statute
defining the offense, he acts while having one of the mental states described in Sections
4-4 through 4-7 [intent, knowledge, recklessness, negligence].
DECKER, supra note 36, at 2-36 (quoting 720 ILCS 5/4-3(a) (West 1993)). "The general mental-
state provision contained in paragraph 5/4-3... Subparagraph (b) provides[:] ... If the statute
does not prescribe a particular mental state applicable to an offense (other than an offense which
involved absolute liability), any mental state defined in Sections 4-4 [intent], 4-5 [knowledge] or
4-6 [recklessness] is applicable." Id. Of course, because recklessness is reserved for the crime of
involuntary manslaughter, provocation voluntary manslaughter would require a mental state of
either intent or knowledge. O'Neill, "With Malice Toward None", supra note 4, at 112-13. "Con-
sequently, murder and voluntary manslaughter no longer need to be viewed as different crimes.
Instead, they should be characterized as different degrees of the same crime-an unjustified kill-
ing performed intentionally or knowingly." Id. at 113.
209. See supra note 93 (quoting the relevant portion of the Illinois second degree murder
statute).
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mitigating factors are not elements of second degree murder; they ex-
ist merely to mitigate one's culpability and to lessen the resulting sen-
tence imposed.210 Thus, the "specific offense" language, as used by
the Lopez court, clearly accommodates the crime of second degree
murder.
Even if such a crime does not fall within the court's strict construc-
tion, a looser interpretation is certainly in order. As two Illinois crimi-
nal law experts recently proclaimed:
[I]t is clear that the word 'specific' was placed in the attempt statute
merely to make it clear that an intent to commit any crime was not
sufficient to establish attempt; rather, one needed an intent to com-
mit the specific acts contained in a particular statutory definition in
order to be found guilty of an attempt to commit any particular
offense.211
Applied to the statute at hand, the defendant simply has to harbor an
intent to kill, while committing some act in furtherance of that intent,
for an attempt conviction to lie. In other words, the attending mitigat-
ing factors are irrelevant to the issue of criminal attempt because the
words "specific offense" focus only upon the requisite acts.
In addition, one renowned legal scholar, Professor John F. Decker,
has implied that the "specific offense" language is merely aimed at
avoiding the imposition of punishment on a person who has "the in-
tent to engage in some wrongdoing that did not amount to a crime. 212
Thus, a less strict interpretation of criminal attempt would clearly con-
form to the wording of the statute, as well as to the common interpre-
tations thereof.
On the other hand, without a relaxed interpretation, the statute de-
fies common sense. A strict interpretation of the attempt statute's
language erroneously assumes that a person generally harbors an in-
tent to commit a specific crime. In fact, the majority of criminals, un-
educated in the law, could never intend to commit a specific offense.
Such would require legal knowledge of all the requisite elements.
This is illogical. Instead, it appears more appropriate to require that
the defendant intend to commit particular criminal acts.
210. People v. Jeffries, 646 N.E.2d 587, 595 (I11. 995).
211. O'Neill & Perlman, supra note 31, at 18.
212. DECKER, supra note 36, at 5-3, 5-4. Professor John F. Decker states:
The Illinois courts are very clear that proof of specific intent is imperative for a convic-
tion of criminal attempt. The intent must be that an offense cannot be merely an open-
ended, vague desire to commit criminality generally; the courts make it clear that the
intent must be "an intent to commit a specific offense." If a defendant had the intent to
engage in some wrongdoing that did not amount to a crime, he or she cannot be con-
victed of a criminal attempt.
19961
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Of course, a finding that one does not have to intend the existence
of the mitigating factors of second degree murder in order to attempt
that crime would not compromise the fact that a criminal attempt re-
quires a specific intent. Rather, like attempted first degree murder,
attempted second degree murder would require the intent to kill. The
existence of the factors in mitigation would merely reduce the defend-
ant's culpability and resulting sentence. Thus, the specific intent re-
quired of attempt crimes would exist because, despite his motives, the
defendant desired that his acts result in the death of another.213
Therefore, in holding that attempted second degree murder would
illogically require an intent that certain mitigating circumstances be
present, the Lopez court rendered an unduly strict interpretation of
criminal attempt. That interpretation leaves "the intent to commit a
specific offense" language at odds with common sense. However,
whether or not such a judicial interpretation is allowed to stand, the
crime of second degree murder is a logical reality.
2. The "Intent to Kill" Itself Is Sufficient to Establish an Attempt
Crime
Even if the Lopez court were to concede that the defendant does
not have to intend that the mitigating factors be present in order to be
convicted of attempted second degree murder, its contention is that an
intent to kill is insufficient to constitute a crime. 214 Rather, the court
stated that one would have to show an intent to kill unlawfully.2 15
The Lopez court's interpretation of the homicide statute is illogical.
Initially, the Lopez court, just as the Reagan court before it, errone-
ously concluded that the intent to kill is not a crime. On the contrary,
Illinois courts routinely hold that "[t]o prove attempted first degree
murder, the State must prove that with intent to kill, the defendant
committed an act which constitutes a substantial step toward the com-
mission of the murder. '2 16 Thus, the intent to kill, coupled with the
requisite actions, should be sufficient to support a conviction for an
attempt crime.
213. For a definition of specific intent, see supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
214. People v. Lopez, 655 N.E.2d 864, 867 (Ii. 1995).
215. Id. Of course, the argument against attempted second degree murder based on a sudden
and intense passion goes no further than the previous discussion. That is, the words "without
lawful justification" are not an impediment to recognizing that crime even though there is no
belief that one's actions are justified.
216. People v. Burrage, 645 N.E.2d 455, 462 (I11. App. Ct. 1994) (emphasis added); see People
v. Feyrer, 646 N.E.2d 1244, 1250 (I11. App. Ct. 1994) (noting that the specific intent to kill is
necessary to convict of attempted murder and that such an intent can be inferred from the de-
fendant's acts).
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The Lopez and Reagan courts further erred in holding that one
would have to intend to kill "without lawful justification" to be con-
victed of attempted murder. In the case of imperfect self-defense at-
tempted second degree murder, this would be an impossibility, the
Lopez court found, because even an unreasonable belief in the need
to defend oneself would mean that one did not intend to kill unlaw-
fully. 217 It stated, "[t]he two different intents, intent to kill unlawfully
and intent to kill in self-defense, cannot coexist in the same crime. '218
Here, the court confuses the intent requirement with the jury's task
during deliberations. That is, the phrase "without lawful justification"
is not an element of the crime of first or second degree murder.
Rather, "this language merely refers to affirmative defenses the de-
fendant could interpose once charged; accordingly, the State is under
no obligation to affirmatively prove in each murder prosecution that
the killing was without lawful justification unless the accused offers
some evidence that his or her killing was justified. ' 219 Only then does
the issue of whether the killing was without lawful justification be-
come a question of fact for the jury to determine. Therefore, the spe-
cific intent to commit an offense needed for criminal attempt does not
include an intent that one's acts be unlawful.
That the Lopez court was wrong to interpret "without lawful justifi-
cation" as it did is confirmed by a reading of the Illinois Homicide
Code. For instance, the first degree murder statute, which is relevant
to any second degree murder discussion, provides: "A person who
kills an individual without lawful justification commits first degree
murder if, in performing the acts which cause the death . . . he...
intends to kill . . ,, 220 Clearly, the statute itself demands that the
words "without lawful justification" be interpreted as a conclusion of
fact that is distinct from the elements of the crime itself.
Further light is shed on this issue upon considering the involuntary
manslaughter provisions. That statute provides: "A person who unin-
tentionally kills an individual without lawful justification commits in-
voluntary manslaughter if his acts ... are such as are likely to cause
death .... and he performs them recklessly .... ,"221 The fact that the
217. People v. Lopez, 655 N.E.2d 864, 867 (Ill. 1995).
218. Id.
219. DECKER, supra note 35, at 201; see People v. Feyrer, 646 N.E.2d 1244, 1250 (I11. App. Ct.
1994) (stating that once the claim of self-defense is raised by the defendant, the State is then
required to disprove the use of justifiable force); People v. Austin, 574 N.E.2d 1297, 1303 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1991) (holding that the attempt to kill without lawful justification is established once
the defendant's self-defense argument is rejected).
220. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 1996) (emphasis added).
221. 720 ILCS 5/9-3(a) (West 1996) (emphasis added).
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same language is used in this unintentional crime shows that these
words denote a conclusion of fact rather than a matter of intent.
Therefore, the Lopez court erred when it held that one must intend
to kill without lawful justification in order to commit attempted mur-
der. The intent to kill is routinely found sufficient to establish crimi-
nal culpability. Furthermore, the words "without lawful justification"
do not constitute an element of the specific offense of murder. In-
stead, the words are a "catchall phrase" to be used in jury instructions
in the case of affirmative defenses. 222
C. The Disproportionality that Results from Lopez Is at Odds with
Legislative Intent and the Illinois Constitution
Finally, the decision in People v. Lopez is wrong simply because it is
fundamentally unfair. The elimination of attempted second degree
murder leaves would-be offenders subject to higher criminal penalties
than they might otherwise receive. Such injustice was not the intent of
the Illinois legislature. In fact, the holding in Lopez interferes with
the Illinois Criminal Code scheme. Perhaps more importantly, the
disparity in sentencing caused by Lopez violates the Illinois
Constitution.
1. Legislative Intent Militates in Favor of Recognizing Attempted
Second Degree Murder
Without the crime of attempted second degree murder, a defendant
may receive an increased sentence if his or her victim fortuitously
lives. This absurdity stems from the fact that the absence of attempted
second degree murder leaves attempted first degree murder as the
most significant alternative. 223 After all, the actus reus and mens rea
for the two crimes are exactly the same.224 Unfortunately, there are
substantial sentencing differences between the two.
Generally, the penalty structure in Illinois consists of ten grades
within which each offense is categorized.225 For instance, after first
222. O'Neill & Perlman, supra note 31, at 15.
223. See infra notes 247-52 and accompanying text (discussing the unsatisfactory alternatives
to attempted second degree murder).
224. See supra notes 207-08 and accompanying text (making this argument).
225. 730 ILCS 5/5-5-1, council commentary (revised 1973) (West 1993).
The purpose of classifying offenses into graded categories is twofold: to assist the Leg-
islature in creating an ordered system of offenses by seriousness, and to simplify the
sentencing choices which a judge must make in criminal cases. The ultimate purpose of
both of these is to eliminate disparity of sentencing and produce more evenhanded
justice.
730 ILCS 5/5-5-1.
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and second degree murder, which are separate classes, there are Class
X, 1, 2, 3 and 4 felonies.226 Each grade is assigned a range of possible
penalties from which a sentencing judge must choose. Specifically, a
conviction for second degree murder carries with it a penalty range of
four to twenty years.227 Attempted first degree murder, a Class X fel-
ony,228 carries with it a sentencing range of six to thirty years.229 Ad-
ditionally, probation may be imposed for second degree murder,
barring certain aggravating factors,230 whereas it is never an option for
attempted first degree murder.231 Therefore, pursuant to the Supreme
Court of Illinois' opinion in Lopez, a defendant's fate may depend
entirely upon whether his victim happens to die, rather than on his
level of culpability. In fact, in the cases underlying the supreme
court's opinion, defendants Lopez and Cruz received sentences of
twenty-five and thirty years respectively, more than they could have
received had their victims died.
It is clear that the Illinois legislature did not intend to foster such
unjust results. Indeed, the committee comments to the Illinois at-
tempt statute declare that all crimes are subject to the statute unless
they are explicitly excluded.232 Moreover, the true intent of the Illi-
nois legislature can be found in its stated purpose for enacting the
criminal code. The Illinois Criminal Code provides:
General Purposes. The provisions of this Code shall be construed in
accordance with the general purposes hereof, to:
(a) Forbid and prevent the commission of offenses;
(b) Define adequately the act and mental state which constitute
each offense, and limit the condemnation of conduct as criminal
when it is without fault;
(c) Prescribe penalties which are proportionate to the seriousness of
offenses and which permit recognition of differences in rehabilita-
tion possibilities among individual offenders;
(d) Prevent arbitrary or oppressive treatment of persons accused or
convicted of offenses.233
226. 730 ILCS 5/5-5-1(b) (West 1993). In addition, there are three grades of misdemeanor
offenses. 730 ILCS 5/5-5-1(c) (West 1993).
227. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1.5) (West 1996). Second degree murder is a Class 1 felony. How-
ever, the legislature recently increased the maximum allotted sentence for second degree murder
to twenty years, as opposed to the maximum of fifteen years allotted for all other Class 1 felo-
nies. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(4) (West 1996).
228. 720 ILCS 5/8-4(c) (West 1994).
229. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(3) (West 1996).
230. 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3(c) (West 1996).
231. 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3(c)(2)(B) (West 1996).
232. 720 ILCS 5/8-4, 1961 committee comments 437 (West 1993).
233. 720 ILCS 5/1-2 (West 1993) (emphasis added); see also People v. Pardue, 361 N.E.2d 383,
384 (1977) (stating that "the purpose of sentencing is to provide adequate punishment for the
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With respect to the specific crime of second degree murder (volun-
tary manslaughter), it is helpful to recall the origin of that crime. 234 It
was enacted as "a concession to the frailty of man, a recognition that
the average person can understandably react violently to a sufficient
wrong and hence some lesser punishment is appropriate. ' 235
Although we may empathize with a person who is provoked to such
an extent, it must be recognized that that person, when committing
the injurious act(s), still harbors an intent to kill.2 36 Thus, even in
1961, the people of Illinois, through their legislature, transformed the
homicide scheme so that murder and voluntary manslaughter became
essentially the same crime.2 37 At the same time, the people decided
that the events leading up to the formation of an intent to kill may
justify a lesser penalty for voluntary manslaughter.
Furthermore, "[t]he sentencing provisions of the criminal attempt
prohibition tie the penalty for attempt to that of the principal
crime. '"238 In fact, the attempt statute provides that the sentencing
range for a criminal attempt shall mirror that which corresponds to
crimes that are a classification below the one attempted.2 39 In other
words, an attempt to commit a Class 1 felony receives the sentencing
offense, safeguard society from further offenses, and to restore the offender to useful
citizenship").
234. See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text (discussing the history and origin of volun-
tary manslaughter (second degree murder)).
235. State v. Robinson, 643 A.2d 591, 594 (N.J. 1994) (citations omitted). This "frailty of
man" theory applies just as well to imperfect self-defense manslaughter because the defendant
with such a claim honestly held the belief that he acted justifiably, but failed to measure up to
the average man standard in that his belief was unreasonable.
236. It is clear that an intent to kill or knowledge that one's actions will result in the death of
another is required by the second degree murder statute. See supra note 92 and accompanying
text (providing the relevant portions of that statute); see also supra note 133 and accompanying
text (discussing the mental state required for second degree murder and emphasizing that it is
nothing less than intentional).
237. See supra notes 50-54, 208 and accompanying text (discussing the fact that the 1961 stat-
ute essentially transformed the two offenses into the same crime).
238. DECKER, supra note 36, at 5-3 (citing ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 8-4, 1961 committee com-
ments 500 (Smith-Hurd 1989) and 720 ILCS 5/8-4(c) (West 1993)).
239. 720 ILCS 5/8-4(c) (West 1994). This statute provides the sentence structure for attempt
crimes:
A person convicted of an attempt may be fined or imprisoned or both not to exceed the
maximum provided for the offense attempted ....
(1) the sentence for attempt to commit first degree murder is the sentence for a Class X
felony ... ;
(2) the sentence for attempt to commit a Class X felony is the sentence for a Class 1
felony;
(3) the sentence for attempt to commit a Class 1 felony is the sentence for a Class 2
felony;
(4) the sentence for attempt to commit a Class 2 felony is the sentence for a Class 3
felony;
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range given for a Class 2 felony.240 Clearly, this scheme militates in
favor of imposing similar penalties for both second degree murder and
its inchoate counterpart. The result would be consistent with the gen-
eral purposes of the Criminal Code.241
The Lopez court's interpretation of the attempt and homicide stat-
utes runs afoul of Illinois legislative intent and the public policy upon
which it is based. In making penalties for attempt crimes based on
those for the completed offense, the Illinois legislature intended to
punish equally those with similar culpability. Thus, because the legis-
lature obviously intended to provide for a mitigated murder offense, it
must have entertained the same intention for attempted murder. 242
Otherwise, its stated purpose-"to prescribe penalties which are pro-
portionate to the seriousness of offenses"-would be compromised. 243
That is, when a person's act, if completed, would render him culpable
of second degree murder, it is contrary to the Criminal Code to find
him guilty of attempted murder, which seeks to punish a higher level
of culpability, when the crime is incomplete. It is blatantly unfair to
punish a person more severely for an uncompleted, as opposed to a
completed, crime.
2. The Lopez Holding Violates the Illinois Constitution
The Lopez opinion also stands in contravention of the Illinois Con-
stitution. The Illinois Constitution requires that "all penalties ... be
determined... according to the seriousness of the offense." 244 How-
ever, the Lopez decision ensures that those with lesser culpability may
receive the same sentence as more culpable criminals. Therefore, Lo-
pez violates the Illinois Constitution.
Nevertheless, the Lopez court rejected the argument that its deci-
sion would violate the Illinois Constitution.245 Rather, the court de-
clared that it would only "override the judgment of the General
Assembly with respect to criminal penalties" when the penalty is
"cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense com-
mitted as to shock the moral sense of the community." 246 As the
(5) the sentence for attempt to commit any felony other than those specified in Subsec-
tions (1), (2), (3), and (4) hereof is the sentence for a Class A misdemeanor.
720 ILCS 5/8-4(c).
240. 720 ILCS 5/8-4(c).
241. See supra note 233 and accompanying text (quoting the text of the Criminal Code).
242. People v. Lopez, 655 N.E.2d 864, 871 (Ill. 1995) (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
243. 720 ILCS 5/1-2(c) (West 1994).
244. ILL. CONST., art. I, § 11.
245. Lopez, 655 N.E.2d at 868.
246. Id.
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discussion above demonstrates, the absence of attempted second de-
gree murder undoubtedly results in disproportionality. Whether a
minimum of two extra years in the penitentiary, a possibility of ten
additional years in the penitentiary, or the impossibility of probation
is "cruel," "degrading," or "wholly disproportionate" is a matter of
opinion. Regardless of the desirability of the court's opinion, how-
ever, its argument on this point fails.
The court's argument fails because the decision to recognize at-
tempted second degree murder would not override the legislature's
judgment as to criminal penalties. Indeed, although it is unclear
whether the Illinois legislature would recognize the offense of at-
tempted second degree murder, it has definitely not expressed any
specific judgment with respect to its penalty. At most, the Illinois leg-
islature ambiguously made a judgment as to whether attempted sec-
ond degree murder should exist. Clearly, the court would not be
overriding its judgment by recognizing that crime. Therefore, the Lo-
pez opinion violates the Illinois Constitution because it ensures that
all penalties are not in proportion to the seriousness of offenses.
IV. IMPACr
As a result of the Lopez decision, which holds that the crime of
attempted second degree murder does not exist, prosecutors and fact
finders statewide are left in an untenable position. If either believes a
conviction for attempted first degree murder is not in order, without
the compromise presented by an attempted second degree murder of-
fense, he or she may be forced to pursue less-than-favorable options.
For instance, the most common alternative to the would-be offense of
attempted second degree murder seems to be aggravated battery.247
That crime, however, is merely a Class 3 felony carrying a penalty of
two to five years.248 Besides, aggravated battery involves an intent or
knowledge that great bodily harm will result from the actor's con-
duct.249 Such a crime cannot fill the void left by the Lopez court be-
cause an offense of attempted second degree murder would clearly
247. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 581 N.E.2d 113, 118 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (affirming the de-
fendant's conviction for armed violence predicated on aggravated battery and reversing his con-
viction for attempted second degree murder); People v. Reagan, 444 N.E.2d 742, 746 (I11. App.
Ct. 1982) (rejecting the State's argument that the "minor charges of aggravated assault or aggra-
vated battery" are insufficient to serve as an alternative to a would-be attempted second degree
murder conviction). Aggravated battery is battery committed with the intent or knowledge that
great bodily harm will result or a battery committed with a deadly weapon other than a firearm.
720 ILCS 5/12-4 (West 1996).
248. 720 ILCS 5/12-4(14)(e) (West 1996).
249. 720 ILCS 5/12-4(a) (West 1996).
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punish nothing less than an intent to kill, i.e., a more culpable state of
mind.250
Another option is aggravated battery with a firearm. That crime,
however, is a Class X felony and carries with it the same penalty car-
ried by the offense of attempted first degree murder.251 Moreover,
such an offense has very limited applicability, i.e., when a firearm is
discharged. 252 Thus, the Supreme Court of Illinois has created a gap
in the conviction and sentencing of those who have an intent to kill
another, but have been provoked to that point. Consequently, not
only are the alternatives insufficient, but the lack of guidance to prose-
cutors and judges with respect to offenses that would otherwise be
considered attempted second degree murder leaves too much room
for unfairness and inconsistency in sentencing.
V. CONCLUSION
The Lopez decision is in error because it is based upon unsound
precedent, a misinterpretation of statutory law and a disregard for
fairness and logic. The crime of attempted second degree murder
should exist in Illinois.
Unsound precedent has long accompanied the Illinois homicide
statute, thwarting the legislature's purpose for enacting a criminal
statute at all, as well as destroying its sentencing goals. That prece-
dent and continued misinterpretation have culminated in the opinion
of People v. Lopez. Once the erroneous origin of that opinion is rec-
ognized and understood, the result in Lopez is exposed for its super-
fluous unfairness. It is clearly unfair that a defendant be exposed to
the risk that he or she will receive a greater penalty if the victim lives
rather than dies. That an attempted crime may be punished more se-
verely than its completed offense runs contrary to legislative purpose
as well as common sense. The void left by Lopez is untenable.
Of course, a judicial overruling of Lopez would be appropriate.
Perhaps the safer route to the resolution of this issue lies, however, in
the legislative process. Indeed, it may be time to revise the Illinois
Criminal Code yet again. In particular, the attempt statute should be
reworded so that it explicitly requires only that an individual specifi-
cally intend to commit the acts required for a particular crime, while
harboring the intent to achieve the necessary result. This wording
250. See supra note 216 and accompanying text (discussing murder and the intent to kill).
251. 720 ILCS 5/12-4.2 (West 1996).
252. 720 ILCS 5/12-4.2 (West 1996).
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would definitely accommodate the crime of attempted second degree
murder and fill the void left by People v. Lopez.
Donna Sternicki
